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Two Faces of Hungary:  
From Democratization to Democratic Backsliding 
 
András Bozóki & Eszter Simon 
 
 
Since 1989, Hungary has experienced great political, social, and economic 
changes.  In political terms, in the span of three decades, Hungary accomplished a 
successful and peaceful transition to democracy, consolidated its democracy, 
became a member of the principal Western liberal institutions such as NATO and the 
European Union, and, after experiencing a crisis of public confidence in its 
democratic institutions and its political elite, it witnessed the deconsolidation and the 
erosion of its democracy.  Economically and socially, successive governments have 
grappled with trying to square the circle of high foreign debt, low growth, high 
unemployment, sinking living standards, increasing inequality, and the financial 
untenability of Hungary’s social welfare system.   
Below we point out the most important political, social, and economic 
developments of the past 30 years.  We show that there were some systemically 
encoded factors, such as the non-participatory nature of the democratic regime 
created in 1989 and unexpected external developments (e.g., the 2008 financial 
crisis) that made the process of governing more complex.1  However, the 
deconsolidation of Hungarian democracy and the birth of a heavily centralized hybrid 
regime whose governing practices have been described as typical of a mafia state,2 
were not inevitable.  Rather, it was the choices of the political actors who have 
wielded power since 1989 that are primarily responsible for the systematic 
dismantling of democracy and the development of a peculiar hybrid regime that 
combines features of both liberal democracy and dictatorship.   
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We divide our argument into four subsections.  In the first section, we discuss 
the characteristics of the process of democratic transition.  In the second section, we 
illuminate the process of democratic consolidation, including the role that external 
forces, especially the European Union, played in it, and summarize the success and 
failure of the first 20 years of post-Communist politics in Hungary with an emphasis 
on the latter and the consequent deconsolidation of the regime.  The third section is 
devoted to a discussion of the current populist regime, sometimes in a comparative 
perspective with developments prior to 2010.  Although the Orbán regime is a moving 
target whose final shape is still unclear, we describe both its development and its 
main characteristics as of 2018.  In the final concluding section, we ponder the 
possibilities of re-democratization in Hungary. 
 
FROM COMMUNISM TO DEMOCRACY  
In 1989, Hungarian democracy was born as a result of a peaceful but 
revolutionary process of change that ended four decades of Communist rule and 
established the contours of the new democratic regime.  External as well as internal 
factors paved the way for these changes in the 1980s.  Externally, the rise of Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies allowed more freedom of manoeuvre for 
the rising reformist faction within the Hungarian Communist party and the emergence 
of opposition organizations.3  Furthermore, the success of Solidarity’s “self-limiting 
revolution” 4 in Poland made it clear that the ailing Soviet Union would not rush to the 
defense of its Communist allies in Central Europe as it had done in Hungary in 1956 
and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
Internally, “goulash” communism, which had promised economic well-being 
and more cultural tolerance for Hungarians in exchange for people setting aside their 
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grievances over the tragedy of the 1956 revolution,5 became increasingly untenable 
financially.  The financing of comparatively acceptable living standards in the 1960s 
and early 1970s through foreign loans led to high foreign debt, and the regime was 
no longer able to uphold its end of the compromise: production and living standards 
steadily declined from 1976 onward.  This provoked increasing public criticism and, 
occasionally, resistance.  The aging Communist leadership could not cope with these 
challenges for long, and dissent appeared both inside and outside the Party.   
By 1989, civil society was blossoming: critical intellectuals were active in 
discussion forums and organized new political associations and parties.  At the same 
time, reform-oriented lawyers and economists questioned the very foundations of the 
regime.  Non-violent protests helped to demonstrate the power of the opposition 
forces, and this, along with a desire on all sides to avoid repeating the bloodshed and 
tragedy of the 1956 revolution, led to negotiations between the ruling of Communist 
party, the satellite organizations of the Communist Party, and the Opposition 
Roundtable formed by competing opposition forces to maximize their influence.6  
The most highly esteemed political value and the most important political goal 
of the regime-changing elite was the achievement of freedom, which was understood 
both in its liberal and in its democratic sense.  On the one hand, the desired end 
state was the establishment of liberal freedom.  In the political community they had 
envisioned, people could talk freely and openly both in private and in public, the 
press was free, and the freedoms of assembly and party formation were guaranteed 
as the inalienable right of every citizen.  At the time, freedom was understood in a 
negative rather than a positive sense,7 as independence from the state (the party, the 
police, the military, and the government as a whole).  The goal was individual 
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freedom, that is, the opportunity for individuals to pursue their activities free of 
harassment, interference, and control.   
On the other hand, freedom as a democratic value was identified with popular 
sovereignty, that is, with the idea of a political community that was created by the will 
and consent of the people.  This reflected not only the desire to end forty years of 
Soviet control, but also five hundred years of experience and discontent with foreign 
domination.  Most notably, Hungary had been under the formal control of the 
Ottoman Empire (1541-1686) and the Habsburg Empire (1686-1918), although 
Hungary was granted considerable autonomy in 1867 through the Austro-Hungarian 
Compromise (Ausgleich)and was able to expand its autonomy every ten years, when 
the original agreement came up for renegotiation.  Hungary achieved de jure 
independence at the end of World War I, but paid a considerable price for it.  As a 
defeated power, it lost two-thirds of its historical territory leaving a large number of 
Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary.  Subsequently, Hungary aligned itself 
with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in order to remedy this shock of territorial loss, 
which subsequently resulted in German influence over Hungarian domestic matters.8  
After the end of World War II, Hungary quickly came under Soviet control and a 
communist one-party system was established, which would last for more than four 
decades. 
Since Hungary had had little experience with democracy prior to 1989, 
roundtable participants had to draw on other historical (and philosophical) experience 
to create a new democratic regime.  The result was an understanding of democracy 
as representative government wherein people exercised their constitutional powers 
indirectly through their elected representatives.  While the establishment of civil 
liberties and political competition was vital to the new elite, democratic participation 
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was of lesser priority, simply because of the negative connotation the word 
‘participation’ had acquired during the Communist era, when participation was forced 
on the people.  Be that as it may, the regime changing elite’s preferences for civil 
liberties and competition to the detriment of participatory democracy impacted the 
nature of the democratic political system it had created: besides elections, it would 
come to allow few opportunities for citizen participation, and would remain an elite 
enterprise. 
 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1990-2010) 
The establishment and consolidation of democracy 
The first democratic elections in 1990 signalled both the end of regime 
transition and the beginning of democratic consolidation.  With the heavy amending 
of its constitution and the declaration of a democratic republic replacing the “people’s 
republic”, the institutional requirements of parliamentary democracy had been 
created in 1989.  The parliament became the center of democratic politics.  Its 
members were elected in a complex electoral system that reflected a difficult 
compromise between the Communist party and the Opposition Roundtable and that 
combined single member districts with national and party lists (see table 10.1).  The 
unicameral parliament elected the prime minister, and ministers, as members of the 
cabinet, were responsible to the prime minister directly, not to the parliament.  As this 
arrangement demonstrates, the prime minister was the strongest political actor, 
whose importance was likened to that of the chancellor in Germany.9  Meanwhile, the 
presidency of the republic was largely a ceremonial office with the president elected 
by the parliament.  The parliament also elected the members of the Constitutional 
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Court (for 9 years), and the ombudsmen (for 6 years).  Their independence, just as 
that of the National Bank, was guaranteed constitutionally.10 
 
TABLE 10.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The political elite’s desire in the early 1990s to see Hungary return to Europe 
gave Western political institutions a leverage of influence in the 1990s.  While the 
Council of Europe, which Hungary joined in 1991, and NATO, of which Hungary 
became a member in 1999, were important actors on their own right, the European 
Union emerged as the most influential external player.  This was not unrelated to the 
fact that the idea of joining the EU was also popular with the public that, in the midst 
of the economic hardships that regime change had brought on them, identified the 
European Union with much coveted social welfare.  The EU fostered the 
improvement of democratic practices and the stabilization and maturing of 
democracy in Hungary through the establishment of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993, 
which defined the conditions of EU membership.  These conditions included goals 
such as a functioning democracy, respect for the rule of law, and human rights, and 
the effective protection of minorities.  The annual reports of the European 
Commission on the achievements of Central and Southeast European candidate 
countries in these respects and others, were also helpful tools in supporting and 
reinforcing democratic reforms.  By the time of Hungary’s accession to the EU on 1 
May 2004, it was considered to be a consolidated democracy.11 
The political system between 1990 and 2010 was a liberal democracy 
characterized by a multiparty system, free elections, representative government, 
strong opposition, free media, strong and respected institutions that protected the 
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rule of law and independent courts.  Barring a few striking exceptions, humans rights 
were generally respected, and religious freedoms were not restricted.  Initially, the 
system also offered a great deal of political choice to people, as parties mushroomed 
after 1990.  On the political left, the major players proved to be the center-left 
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which was the successor of the former 
Communist party, and the newly formed left-liberal parties:  the Alliance of Free 
Democrats (SZDSZ) and the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz).  Viable options 
on the political right included two historical parties (i.e., parties that had existed 
before the Communist takeover in 1948)— the agrarian Independent Smallholder’s 
Party (FKGP), the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP)—and the newly 
formed the center-right Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) (see table 10.2). 
 
TABLE 10.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Subsequent electoral competition seemed to suggest a healthy and 
consolidated democracy in which the electorate judged the performance of each 
successive government as substandard and, accordingly, voted them out of office 
until 2006 when the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition government managed to retain its power.  
In 1994, voters replaced the center-right MDF-FKGP-KDNP government with the 
center-left MSZP-SZDSZ coalition, only to vote them out of office in favor of a center-
right coalition led by Fidesz, a party that had moved from the left to the right in the 
previous four years.  In 2002, it was again the turn of a center-left MSZP-SZDSZ 
coalition to govern.  That coalition won a second mandate in 2006, but was voted out 
of office in 2010.  The 2010 elections were a crushing defeat for the Socialists, 
relegating MSZP to the status of a small parliamentary party, and resulted in the 
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collapse of SZDSZ as a political force.  Most voters refrained from extremist 
alternatives at this stage, allowing only one extreme right and revisionist party, the 
Party of Hungarian Life and Justice (MIÉP), a small and temporary surge in 1998.  
Jobbik, a radical right party, composed of younger, more militant supporters who 
endorsed law and order and championed nationalism with racist overtones, only 
gained electoral significance and staying power after 2010 by which time democracy 
was already in serious trouble as a consequence of general disillusionment not only 
with the governing Socialists but also with the political system and the political elite in 
general.   
 
The deconsolidation of democracy 
Loss of confidence in and the deconsolidation of democracy unfolded 
gradually as a result of three parallel and interrelated processes.  First, Hungarian 
democracy evolved into a partocracy,12 that is, a system in which democracy was 
exercised almost exclusively by and through parties.  Matters could only be settled 
through the parties and their clientele as parties took over all aspects of politics:  they 
placed their members even in supposedly independent committees, sought expert 
advice only from their own experts, and had their own journalists write media reports.  
The result was a system in which the welfare of the public became secondary to the 
interests of the parties and their leaders, and in which the effectiveness and 
independence of civil society were compromised as it had to attract funding by 
catering to the interests of the parties.   
Second, the parties reacted to the competition for the increasing spoils of 
government by maximizing their votes through the destruction or assimilation of their 
smaller rivals.  Meanwhile, the political system—especially the five per cent electoral 
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threshold and party financing laws—made it difficult for new parties, which may have 
been able to represent voters’ interests better, to enter parliamentary politics.  In the 
end, only two main rivals—MSZP and Fidesz—remained.  This left voters with 
increasingly few and rather unappealing options, leading them to cast their votes for 
what they believed was the least bad alternative.  At the same time, partocracy and 
strong competition between the parties resulted in the polarization of the party 
system and stronger voter identification with parties.13  Partocracy quickly spread 
polarization between the political left and right to society in general, creating what 
many Hungarians called a “cold civil war”.  Finally, behind the sharp rhetoric that 
characterized the political parties, a system of co-dependence developed within and 
among the parties.  Everyone knew everything about each other, leaving members of 
the political elite vulnerable to blackmail.  Party leaderships maintained their unity by 
threatening the recalcitrant and rewarding the loyal with the spoils that partocracy 
offered.  The loyalty norm discouraged disagreement and political dialogue, further 
limiting the political actors’ ability and desire to innovate and find solutions to the 
acute social and economic problems that had plagued Hungary constantly after 
1989.   
Parallel to political transition, Hungary was also transforming its economy from 
a centrally planned one characterized by full employment to a capitalist one driven by 
profit.  This process affected society as a whole through high inflation, dwindling 
wages, and soaring unemployment, and hit low-skilled workers, the elderly, the 
Roma, and those living outsides major cities the hardest.  Yet, support for the new 
regime remained high:  in the hope for a better future, people were willing to defer 
consumption for a few years.  The political elite also sought to compensate the early 
losers of transition by early retirement, generous pensions, and social assistance 
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benefits financed from income that the privatization of state assets to foreign 
investors generated.  Low corporate taxes and low wages served to attract foreign 
investment but skewed the burden of taxes on the citizens in the form of high income 
tax and high tax rates on consumption.  However, such a system of taxation could 
not offset the loss of privatization as an income source after the mid-1990s, resulting 
in increasing public debts.14 
Regardless of their political leanings, governments reacted to the public debt 
crisis in a uniform fashion.  They introduced reforms in a coup-like manner without 
any social dialogue.  Reforms always meant additional austerity measures that 
demanded further sacrifices from citizens.  It seemed that the political elite thought 
that the patience of society was endless, and that citizens did not need to be co-
opted into decisions that had a major—negative—impact on their livelihoods.  Even 
the Socialists, who normally would have been on the side of society, fell victim to this 
trend, emphasizing to the citizens that “There Is No Alternative” to reforms and 
austerity.15  The Socialist governments in the 2000s sought to offset low wages by 
liberal credit policies.  However, credit-based consumption increased household 
debts ten-fold in 1999-2006, leaving Hungarians with no or little savings and high 
debts, thus, generally unable to face unexpected expenses.  The external shock of 
the 2008 financial crisis drove this home emphatically: many families were falling into 
poverty either because they tried to continue to repay their debts by squeezing the 
family budget in other respects or because they defaulted on their credit payments 
and were losing their homes.16  The new caretaker government of Gordon Bajnai 
reacted to the crisis in the same way as previous ones:  it tackled the public debt 
crisis through a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and introduced 
austerity measures, which were a condition on the IMF loan, but that only increased 
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the plight of the citizenry further.  This was particularly damaging as it came two 
years after the leaking of Prime Minister Gyurcsány’s speech of May 2006 to his 
inner circle in which he openly admitted that the government had mismanaged the 
economy after 2002 and lied about it to the public.17  It appeared that the governing 
Socialists had had a complete disregard for the public, and were more interested in 
using the spoils of politics to enrich themselves and in catering to foreign interests 
than in advocating for the well-being of the country’s citizens. 
In the end, all these political and economic developments cast a negative light 
on the transition process, made the benefits of democracy unclear, and discredited 
the political elite in general.  As a heritage of Communism, citizens were distrustful of 
political institutions from the beginning.  However, two decades of democracy, or 
rather, partocracy, did nothing to increase public trust.  It only further exacerbated 
citizens’ distrust.  People were sick of a partocracy that offered them nothing or 
almost nothing, but because of the weakness of civil society, the limited and shrinking 
opportunities for participation, and the political culture of passive individualism, which 
characterized the post-1956 decades and survived into democracy, they were unable 
to organize themselves to have their voice heard.  As a consequence, people came 
to the conclusion that anything was better than the current regime, especially better 
than the left-liberal parties in government, which suffered the brunt of public wrath.  
By 2010, hundreds of thousands of impoverished people became receptive to the 
message of the extreme right that “Hungary belongs to the Hungarians.”  For the 
majority, Fidesz’s promise of a strong state and strong leadership embalmed in a 
populist, Christian, and ethno-nationalist rhetoric became attractive, and the 
electorate rewarded Fidesz with a two-thirds parliamentary majority that allowed that 
party to do as it pleased. 
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THE ORBÁN REGIME (2010-) 
The erosion of democracy 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán interpreted his two-thirds victory in 2010 as a 
“revolutionary” mandate that created exceptional circumstances in which 
extraordinary means were acceptable.  Accordingly, he deployed warlike, offensive 
tactics, pushing legislation through parliament by which he quickly and systematically 
rebuilt the political and legal systems to his party’s advantage.  As part of this 
process, Fidesz carried out a constitutional coup d’état whereby the 1989 inclusive, 
consensual, and democratic constitution was replaced with the Fundamental Law of 
2011 that concentrated power in the hands of the government: 
 
It [Fidesz] won two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament in a system where a 
single two-thirds vote is enough to change the constitution.  Twelve times in a 
year in office, it amended the constitution it inherited.  Those amendments 
removed most of the institutional checks that could have stopped what the 
government did next – which was to install a new constitution.  The new 
Fidesz constitution was drafted in secret, presented to the Parliament with only 
one month for debate, passed by the votes of only the Fidesz parliamentary 
bloc, and signed by a President that Fidesz had named.  Neither the 
opposition parties nor civil society organizations nor the general public had 
any influence in the constitutional process.  There was no popular 
ratification.18 
 
The resulting Fundamental Law was the codification of the electoral manifesto 
of Fidesz.  It established the System of National Cooperation (NER) that Orbán had 
advocated during the 2010 elections as a new social contract.19  Starting with a vow, 
which listed Hungarian’s pride and hope and pledged to join hands and build a better 
future, the new constitutional document increased the role of religion, traditions and 
national values, in effect establishing a “national religious belief system.”  This new 
politicized Christianity was unusual in Central Europe, and also a novel development 
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in comparison with the rest of Europe.  The new document subtly limited the breadth 
of democracy.  For example, it deemphasized the importance of individual freedoms 
by lumping them together with communal interests.  Though the Fundamental Law (in 
one sentence only) formally maintained the form of a republic, it broke with the 
essential notion of a republic, by changing the name of the country from “Republic of 
Hungary” to simply “Hungary.”  As it stressed the importance of a unified nation, it 
disregarded certain social minorities and their protection: equality before the law was 
defined in terms of gender, ethnicity, and religion, but did not include legal protection 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.20  
Orbán moved less subtly as he employed a combination of legal measures 
and informal political practices to limit political competition.21  After coming to power, 
the Fidesz government filled the National Electoral Commission, which was 
responsible for conducting clean and smooth elections, with its own people.  Legal 
changes introduced shortly before the municipal elections of 2010 made it more 
difficult for smaller parties to gain seats in local governments.  Regarding 
parliamentary elections, a completely new law was passed, which left the mixed 
system from 1989 largely in place, but further decreased its proportionality in order to 
make the life of smaller parties difficult.  The number of single-member districts 
increased in proportion to the seats that can be gained through party lists.  The total 
number of parliamentary representatives was cut radically (from 386 to 199).  This 
process allowed Fidesz to gerrymander electoral districts to suit its partisan interests:  
the boundaries of electoral districts were drawn so as to make the left-wing districts 
more populous than the right-wing ones.  Under the new law, not only the parties that 
fail to win a seat in a district are compensated through party lists for votes they have 
received, but the party of the winning candidate is also compensated for any votes 
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that it gains in excess of the number of votes that were necessary to win the seat in a 
given electoral district (see table 10.1).  To increase the chances of Fidesz to win re-
election, the electoral campaign period was reduced, and campaign advertisements 
in the commercial media were banned.  The new candidate nomination process, 
which directs parties to collect hand-filled nomination tickets instead of printed tickets 
that each voter had received from the electoral commission when elections were 
called, became a hotbed for electoral fraud that disproportionally affects districts 
where Fidesz is in trouble.22  Furthermore, the composition of the electorate was 
changed by granting voting rights to Hungarians in neighbouring countries who vote 
overwhelmingly for Fidesz and by making it difficult for Hungarians living in other 
countries—most likely anti-Fidesz voters—to cast a vote.23  The result is an electoral 
system that is neither fair nor free.24  It is heavily biased in favor of the only large 
party in the system, Fidesz, which won re-election with 2/3 majorities both in 2014 
and in 2018 after receiving less than 50 per cent of the votes.25  This is the most 
disproportionate mixed electoral system in Europe. 
 As for the 2018 parliamentary elections, the OSCE-ODIHR statement claimed 
that the elections were characterized by a pervasive overlap between state and ruling 
party resources, undermining contestants’ ability to compete on an equal basis.  
Voters had a wide range of political options but intimidating and xenophobic rhetoric, 
media bias and opaque campaign financing constricted the space for genuine 
political debate, hindering voters’ ability to make fully-informed choices.… Contrary to 
OSCE commitments, citizen election observation is not permitted.”26  Another 
independent analysis arrived at similar conclusions stating that the Fidesz leadership 
led a fundamentally racist campaign against migrants and foreigners, with 
“disproportionate resources and the explicit backing of state institutions, which 
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focused on fear-mongering, employed conspiracy theories and fake news, and 
issued some open threats.  The ruling party neither engaged in open public debate 
on its governing record, nor presented concrete policy plans.”27 
The lines between party and politics became blurred in other respects as well.  
After 2010, the government put its own loyal supporters at the head of institutions 
that are supposed to have oversight of the legislative and executive branches of 
government (e.g., the Ombudsmen and the State Audit Agency).  The independence 
of the justice system was curtailed by curbing the rights of lawyers in criminal 
proceedings and by forcing judges into early retirement.  Public institutions were 
renamed government institutions, and the Orbán government introduced laws that 
made the immediate dismissal of public employees without cause possible, opening 
the way for the cleansing of the entire government apparatus.  Soon, public 
administration became politicized and riddled with conflicts of interest. 
The fate of the Constitutional Court is a good example of how Orbán punishes 
any individual or institution that resists his power grab.  In the autumn of 2010 the 
Constitutional Court repealed a government statute because of its unconstitutional 
retroactive effects.  Subsequently, Fidesz retaliated by amending the Constitution, 
limiting the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.  Fidesz further ensured that the Court 
complied with its policies, and the Court became a puppet of the government when 
the parliament changed the selection of the head of the Constitutional Court and the 
number of its members.  Now it is the parliament that appoints the head of the 
Constitutional Court while beforehand members selected the president of the court 
from among their own ranks.  The number of judges was raised from eleven to fifteen 
so that Fidesz could pack the court with right-wing personalities and former politicians 
close to Fidesz. 
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Opposition opinions have been forced out of much of the Hungarian media.  
Although the neutrality of public-service media channels had always been a problem, 
they have broadcast exclusively government propaganda since 2010.  State-
sponsored television news reports resemble criminal shows in which the 
denunciations and character assassination of political opponents have replaced 
political debate.  The media laws of 2010, which the European Parliament 
condemned in 2011 for violating the freedom of the press,28 gave extensive rights to 
a supervisory authority the membership of which consists exclusively of Fidesz 
loyalists.  This body has the right to issue disproportionately high financial penalties 
at its discretion to print and electronic media outlets and even to bloggers for the 
violation of media laws.  These measures have effectively curtailed press freedom 
through intimidation and fear, resulting in self-censorship on the part of journalists 
and television reporters.  Today free speech is restricted to blogs.  At the same time, 
the government—often through its new and pro-Fidesz national capitalist class—
bought up media outlets, which it either transformed to its own image (e.g., TV2, 
origo.hu, Figyelő), or suspended its operations (e.g., the biggest opposition 
newspaper, Népszabadság).  In other cases (e.g., Klubrádió), the government used 
or tried to use the power of the law, more specifically its control over the tenders that 
allocate media frequencies, to eliminate opposition media outlets.29  The diversity of 
the media has further shriveled in the wake of the 2018 elections.  Two conservative 
media outlets—the daily Magyar Nemzet and Lánchíd Rádió—owned by Orbán’s 
former friend and current nemesis, Lajos Simicska, were closed the week after the 
2018 national elections due to financial difficulties.  The English language online 
newspaper, Budapest Beacon, ceased operating the same week citing the 
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impossibility of publishing a fact-based newspaper as a result of the erosion of media 
plurality.30 
 
The characteristics of the Orbán regime 
These changes resulted in a sharp decline in the democratic credentials of the 
Hungarian political system.  Hungary’s Freedom in the World score dropped from 91 
(out of 100) to just 72 between 2006 and 2018 (see figure 10.1).  Other measures, 
such as the Democracy Index of the UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit or the 
Democracy Barometer, evidence the same trend.31  The new regime that Orbán likes 
to call an “illiberal democracy” but his critics see as a “postmodern autocracy”,32 is in 
effect a hybrid regime that combines democratic and autocratic features.33  According 
to the Hungarian philosopher, Ágnes Heller, “illiberal democracy is a postmodern 
form of despotism” since dictators do not need to come to power by violent means 
anymore but by the will of the majority.34  Democratic institutions remain in place 
formally, but they no longer offer effective control over governmental power.  Most of 
the media are controlled by the government, and journalists and private citizens are 
equally hesitant to speak up in fear of losing their jobs.  Political competition is 
possible, but the broader institutional structure is biased against the opposition.  The 
opposition is fragmented, consisting of numerous small and competing parties (see 
table 10.3) and is unable to unite, which would be their only chance of beating 
Fidesz.  Social protests periodically flare up as was the case when the government 
wanted to tax internet services or when it started to target Central European 
University, the last stronghold of liberalism in Hungary, but so far such protests failed 
to generate a political force.35  
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FIGURE 10.1 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 10.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The regime operates on the basis of a mixture of an extreme centralization of 
power, the institutionalization of corruption, populist measures, and nationalistic 
rhetoric.  Political power is concentrated in the hands of one person, Vikor Orbán, 
who tends to make all major political decisions himself, and controls resources 
informally through his “adopted political family” made up of party-members and 
personal and business friends who are bound together by a strong loyalty norm.36  
They are the winners of lucrative government tenders, the holders of powerful 
political offices, and the major beneficiaries of the governments’ social and economic 
policies, including a flat tax rate.  The ruling party has legislated corruption into state 
policy.  Thus, corruption no longer comes from outside the state; on the contrary, it 
has become the leading principle of the state.37 
The political process is used to advance the personal goals of the Prime 
Minister, which are political and material, and not ideological, for Orbán believes that 
the era of ideology is over.  Most importantly, Orbán has been interested and has 
encouraged the establishment of a new political, economic, and social elite.  
Corruption as well as the restructuring of industries (e.g., the tobacco industry, 
agriculture or tourism), which is often achieved through nationalization and 
subsequent reprivatization, are means by which a new national capitalist class has 
been built.38  Usually, the future members of this class first participate in the creation 
of the relevant legislation, then reap the harvest of legal provisions that were tailored 
to their interests.  In effect, the state has been captured by a closed group of like-
minded political and economic entrepreneurs,39 a new elite with homogenized 
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attitudes.  This group uses the state to extract resources for its own particular goals 
under the aegis of the common good and through the practice of power conversion 
whereby political power strengthens their economic power and vice versa.  This way 
the capitalist economy is replaced with a relational economy in which one’s political 
power defines one’s economic opportunities.40 
The Orbán regime is indeed a “postmodern autocracy” in that its policies are 
selective in targeting various social strata in diverse and contradictory ways.  The 
regime favors the rich (e.g., through the neo-liberal policy of flat tax rates) in order to 
win their support for the regime.  As for the middle and lower middle classes, who 
fear that they might slide down the social ladder, they are kept in the state of constant 
anxiety and mobilization through ethno-nationalist propaganda.  With regard to the 
Roma and the destitute, the discriminatory and authoritarian views prevalent in the 
interwar era are bolstered,41 while in treating the retirees, the socialist pragmatic 
policy of “peaceful coexistence” is applied.  Social exclusion happens not only 
hierarchically but also horizontally.  The government has been determined to break 
up civil society and horizontal networks of solidarity into smaller groups that do not 
communicate with one another.  Thus, the idea of social exclusion is linked to the 
practice of divide et impera.  The regime is based on mentalities, prejudices, and fear 
rather than any coherent ideology. 
The government used educational reforms to socialize the citizenry into the 
system of national cooperation and to reduce social mobility so as to bring the 
process of change to a close by entrenching the new social hierarchy.  Local 
government and foundation schools were nationalized, and a significant number of 
these schools were placed in the hands of churches.  The curriculum was 
homogenized in public schools and graduation age was reduced from 18 to 16 years.  
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The law on public education saw discipline rather than learning as the primary goal of 
public education, and extended the right of the state so that it could intervene in the 
lives of children and parents.  The new higher education law also limits the number of 
students that can be accepted into universities with financial aid from the state.  To 
prevent citizens seeking social mobility abroad, it also mandates students to 
retroactively repay their tuition fees if they choose to live abroad after completing 
their studies.   
The government maintains its middle-class support base by a variety of 
populist measures, while it ignores the plight of the Roma, the unemployed, and the 
poor who are unlikely to vote for Fidesz or vote at all.  Populist policies aim at dividing 
the population and distracting people’s attention from other government decisions 
that are detrimental to them, such as the changes in the labor code (which severely 
limited workers’ and unions’ rights) and the scandalous state of the health care 
system, or from the government’s corrupt practices.  The government uses programs 
that offer immediate and tangible financial benefits for citizens (e.g., reduction in the 
prices of electricity, gas and other utility costs by law and programs that have allowed 
a select group of citizens to replace their home appliances or have holidays at 
reduced prices).  The government is determined to restrict the operations of civic 
organizations by making their financial future uncertain.  Similarly, the Orbán 
government launched a systematic campaign against its “enemies”, including 
outstanding artists, scholars, and intellectuals who criticized or disagreed with them 
and certain former politicians, members of the government or office-holders, as well 
as left-wing and liberal intellectuals, with the aim of criminalizing them.   
The government communicates populist measures with ruthless efficiency.  
For example, service providers have been required to state on the bills they issue the 
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amount of money the consumer “saved” thanks to the government.42  Third, the 
government organizes “national consultations” with citizens from time to time 
whereby the Prime Minister writes to each citizen asking for their opinions in mail-
order questionnaires.  These questionnaires are heavily biased and make it 
impossible to express objections to government policies.  Indeed, the real purpose of 
this consultative process is not to listen to what the citizens think, but rather to keep 
Fidesz supporters engaged by informing them about the policy positions they should 
propagate.  “Results” are used as propaganda tools to legitimize the government’s 
policies. 
Political messages also serve to unify the conservative support base of 
Fidesz.  This group is known for its symbolic rhetoric of national unification and 
traditionalist ideals.  As part of its nationalistic discourse, Orbán proclaimed the day 
of the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty (which followed World War I) as a day of national 
unity, thereby exploiting the nostalgia for Admiral Miklós Horthy’s nationalist and 
revanchist interwar policies.  At the same time, the Orbán government attempted to 
rewrite history to suggest that all Hungarians had been victims of German Nazism.43  
Prime Minister Orbán regularly criticizes the legacy of Communism, liberalism, and 
the forces of globalization, which he sees as the most important political threat for 
Hungary presently, and offers the idea of an ethnically and culturally homogeneous 
nation as protection against these forces.  The rhetoric of national unification was 
used to legitimize the granting of Hungarian citizenship, including the right to vote, to 
any Hungarians living in neighboring countries who wished to request it.  Economic 
nationalism and national sovereignty have underpinned Orbán’s attacks on banks 
(most Hungarian banks are in foreign hands), the multinational corporations, foreign 
media, and the officials of the European Union.  However, despite the verbal attacks 
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on the multinationals, the regime taxes them lightly, which reveals the characteristic 
hypocrisy of the government.  Domestically, national unification found its expression 
in a historically justified and selective ethno-national conception of the nation44 and in 
the unorthodox policies of the “System of National Cooperation” that seeks to guard 
against the ills of liberal democracy through a combination of statism, economic 
nationalism, crony protectionism, and neo-liberalism.  Meanwhile, the government’s 
traditionalist-conservative rhetoric built around the ideas of work, home, order, family, 
and security45 exploits the emotional impact these slogans have on the more 
traditional part of Hungarian society that cherish these ideals.   
Besides the more positive message of national unity and traditional values, the 
government also uses fear and the creation of enemies to keep its grip on its 
followers.  In particular, liberal philanthropist George Soros has been targeted as the 
mastermind behind a conspiracy that wants to systematically undermine the 
achievements of the government by, for example, dumping migrants on Hungarians.  
Indeed, the 2015 migrant crisis in Europe presented the government with an easy 
target and a golden opportunity.  The government pictured migrants from war-torn 
areas (e.g., Syria) as Muslim-extremists and as faceless and inhuman creatures that 
move around in hoards as puppets of evil liberal forces, and vowed to protect the 
country and Christianity from them.   
In reality, it is emigration—and not immigration—that has emerged as a 
national trend.  Hungarians, who did not initially live with the opportunity that the 
freedom of movement in the EU offered them, reacted to the absence of political 
diversity and economic opportunities by moving abroad: an estimated 500,000 
people—out of about 10 million—have left the country in the last few years to seek a 
better life primarily in Germany, France, the UK, and Austria.  Today more 
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Hungarians live in London than in Debrecen, the second largest city in the country.46 
At the beginning, it was mostly the highly-educated who spoke foreign languages 
who left, but they were soon followed by blue collar workers, creating a labor 
shortage in Hungary.  This mass emigration is particularly noteworthy because it has 
no major tradition in Hungary.47  The trend is projected to continue until 2030 with 30-
35,000 people leaving annually,48 robbing the country of tax contributions that could 
sustain its already underfinanced social services.   
In 2010, despite the broad dissatisfaction with democracy and its benefits, 
democratic backsliding was not inevitable.  Rather, that outcome was a result of a 
combination of choices by significant domestic and international actors.  First, 
although the development of the new regime could be seen as simply a direct 
outcome of the competition fueled by partocracy, much of the shape it has taken was 
guided by Orbán’s view of politics and his own role in it.  Orbán defines politics as 
“reality without ideology”, which seems to be attested in his political career which saw 
him move from the democratic liberal left to right-wing authoritarianism.49  Thus, 
instead of ideas, Orbán believes in the maximization of power in the political, social, 
and economic realms.  He equates politics with war: confrontation is preferred to 
compromise and the ends justify the means in a process by which opponents have to 
be defeated and eliminated as future contenders for power.50  He believes that he 
naturally embodies the traditional, patriarchal values of hundreds of thousands of 
rural Hungarians.  At the same time, he does not believe in the benefits of political 
pluralism and individual freedom, but in the necessity of a strong leader who can 
assure order. 
Second, significant external actors, such as the United States and the 
European Union, were inefficient in countering antidemocratic developments.  
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Although the Obama administration continually raised concerns about the status of 
human rights or corruption in Hungary, it was unwilling to reprimand an ally which, 
unlike many other NATO allies, was a willing contributor to US military missions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan after 2010.51  More importantly, the European Union that had 
been a driving force behind democratic consolidation could only restrain the attempts 
of the Orbán government to undermine democracy.  With the weakening of rule of 
law in Hungary,52 Hungarians increasingly expected that the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) would remedy the injustices the state committed against 
them. While the rulings of the ECHR meant effective defense to human rights in 
Hungary,  generally speaking, EU institutions were not only too slow to keep up with 
Orbán’s blitzkrieg, but also limited in their means.  For instance, in the absence of 
sanctioning mechanisms to uphold democratic values laid down in Article 2 of the 
Treaty on European Union, the European Commission could use only infringement 
proceedings, informal pressure, and so far mostly empty threats of withholding funds.  
Ironically, EU funds that are the largest sources of systemic corruption in Hungary 
help to sustain the regime, while the EU’s self-proclaimed status as a grouping of 
democratic states provides the current Hungarian regime with a cover of democratic 
legitimacy.  In other words, by its behavior, the EU simultaneously constrains, 
sustains, and legitimizes the Orbán regime.  The result is a special type of hybrid 
regime that can be best described as an externally sustained one.53 
 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1989, Hungary showed two contradictory faces:  between 1990 and 
2010 it was a liberal democracy, whilst it became a hybrid regime after 2010.  
Hungary started out with high hopes in 1989 and built and maintained a functioning 
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democratic system in the twenty years that followed.  It completed the process of 
democratic transition and implemented a sophisticated set of institutions that 
respected the rule of law.  Pro-market regulations and high foreign direct investment 
contributed to fast economic development from 1995 onwards.  Hungary joined 
NATO (1999) and the European Union (2004).  Up until 2006, Hungary appeared to 
be one of the few success stories of the post-communist democratization and 
democratic consolidation.  However, formal political stability had its social costs, 
making an increasing number of people in the rural areas feel marginalized.  These 
costs came to haunt and destabilize democracy between 2006 and 2010.  As a 
consequence, Hungarian democracy has suffered a setback since 2010.  In the last 
decade, democratic rights and freedoms have been withering away, democratic 
institutions have been hollowed out as governing practices have taken an autocratic 
turn. 
What democratic backsliding means for Hungary’s membership in the 
European Union and for the future of democracy in Hungary is not yet entirely clear.  
As for the former, there exists no prior example of reverse transition within the 
European Union.  Hungary is the first EU-member that has taken a non-democratic 
turn, though Poland has followed in Hungary’s tracks.  Because of this lack of 
precedence, it remains to be seen whether it is possible for a semi-authoritarian 
regime to be a fully-fledged member of the European Union in the long run.  As for 
the future of democracy, it is still uncertain whether the current hybrid regime is the 
end product of this backsliding or whether the system is likely to further deteriorate 
into an unequivocally authoritarian regime.  The re-election of Fidesz in 2018 has left 
such an outcome possible, arguably, even likely.  It is high time for Hungarian 
citizens, who had not identified strongly with the post-1989 democratic system, to 
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decide whether they will come to value democracy retrospectively as many of them 
did come to feel nostalgic about the Communist Kádár regime in the 1990s.  It will be 
also important to see if the citizenry would be willing to actively engage in politics, 
beyond occasional protest demonstrations, and work for the re-emergence of 
democracy. 
All in all, it is difficult to tell what the future might hold for the Hungarian 
political system.  A pessimistic reading of Hungarian history certainly suggests a 
bleak future for democracy in Hungary.  According to this view, democratic traditions 
had few roots in Hungary.  Thus, it is not democratic backsliding that represents an 
exception to the rule, but the twenty years of democracy that existed after 1989.  
What we have been witnessing since 2010 is simply the re-emergence of long-term 
historical patterns of authoritarianism.54  Admittedly, the reestablishment of 
democracy in Hungary would be difficult, especially considering the extent to which 
the Orbán regime has cemented itself in power through legal and semi-legal means 
and in light of the inability of opposition forces to unite for the greater good as they 
did in 1989.  However, just as the emergence of democracy and democratic 
backsliding were not inevitable in Hungary, neither is the survival of existing 
authoritarian tendencies. 
It is true that the current authoritarian leadership may appear to have 
consolidated its power.  Nevertheless, an important lesson that can be drawn from 
the fate of democracy in Hungary is that a regime or a political system may appear 
stronger than it really is.  This suggests that there exists a chance for the re-
emergence of democracy.  Whether it will happen depends to a considerable extent 
on the choices and actions of political actors inside and outside the parliament.  
Regardless of what direction Hungarian politics will take in the future, another lesson 
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that its post-1989 history offers is that democracy cannot be narrowly defined purely 
in terms of institutions.55  Institutions can be easily hollowed out by leaders who do 
not respect freedom and other democratic values.  Democracy can only be preserved 
if both the political elite and the electorate are committed to live and act by its values. 
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Abbreviations and names: Political parties, organizations and their year of foundation 
 
Együtt      Together     (2012) 
Fidesz,  Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége,  Federation of Young Democrats  (1988) 
FKGP, Független Kisgazdapárt,  Independent Smallholders Party (1988 [1930]) 
Jobbik, Jobbik Magyarországért,   Movement for a Better Hungary  (2002) 
KDNP, Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt,  Christian Democratic People’s Party (1989[1945] 
LMP,  Lehet Más a Politika   Politics Can Be Different   (2009) 
MDF, Magyar Demokrata Fórum  Hungarian Democratic Forum  (1987) 
MIÉP, Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja,  Hungarian Justice and Life Party  (1993) 
Momentum      Momentum    (2017) 
MSZDP, Magyar Szociáldemokrata Párt,  Hungarian Social Democratic Party (1989 [1890]) 
MSZP, Magyar Szocialista Párt,   Hungarian Socialist Party   (1989) 
Munkáspárt     Worker’s Party   (1989) 
Párbeszéd      Dialogue     (2013) 
SZDSZ, Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, Alliance of Free Democrats   (1988) 
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Table 10.1.  The major characteristics of the electoral system before 2012 and after 2012. 
 1990-2010 2014- 
General features 
Type Mixed Mixed 
Election rounds 2 1 
Turnout requirement for 
valid results in first round 
50% - 
Turnout requirement for 
valid results in first round 
25% - 
Total Number of MPs 
elected 
386 199 
Single member districts 
MPs elected in single 
member districts 
176 106 
Turnout requirements 50% in first round - 
Electoral rules Majority 
MP getting more than 
50% of the vote elected; 
or  
The first three candidates 
plus any candidate over 
15% of the vote proceeds 
to round two where 
candidate with the most 
votes is elected; 
Plurality 
Candidate with the most 
votes elected; 
 
Proportional representation 
MPs elected on regional 
party lists 
152 - 
MPs elected on national 
party (i.e.  compensation) 
lists 
58 93 
Electoral threshold for party 
lists 
4% in 1990; 5% in 1994-
2010 for single party lists 
5% for single party lists 
10% for joint lists of two 
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10% for joint lists of two 
parties 
15% for joint lists of three 
or more parties 
parties 
15% for joint lists of three 
or more parties 
Votes counted at the 
distribution of 
compensation seats 
the sum of votes cast for 
losing candidates of each 
party in the first valid 
round; plus 
the sum of votes 
remaining in the regional 
lists after the distribution 
of the seats 
of each single-seat 
constituency 
The sum of votes cast 
losing candidates of each 
party in the first valid 
round; plus 
the surplus votes of the 
winning candidate over the 
candidate with the second 
most votes 
 
 
Table 10.2.  Hungarian political parties and their ideological positions (1990-2010) 
 
Far Left  Socialist  Liberal Conservative   Far Right 
 
Worker’s Party MSZP   SZDSZ Fidesz    MIÉP 
MSZDP   MDF    Jobbik 
 
       FKGP 
       KDNP 
 
 
Table 10.3.  Hungarian political parties and their ideological positions (after 2010) 
 
Far left Socialist Green  Liberal Nationalist-Populist Far Right 
 
MSZP  LMP  Együtt  before 2015: Fidesz Jobbik  
    Párbeszéd Momentum after 2015: Jobbik Fidesz 
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Figure 10.1.  Changes in the Freedom in the World index in Central and Eastern Europe 
(2006-2018) 
 
Source: https://freedomhouse.org/ 
 
 
 
Timeline showing major events 
 
1989 The formation of the Opposition Roundtable, National 
Roundtable talks between the Communist Party and the 
Opposition Roundtable, in October, proclamation of the third 
Hungarian Republic, democratic constitution accepted and 
unsolved issues resolved through referendum in November. 
1990  The first free elections: the center-right MDF’s election victory.  
Coalition government (MDF-FKGP-KDNP).  Taxi-drivers’ 
blockade as an anti-government protest.   
1994  The return to power of the Communist successor party (MSZP).   
  Coalition government (MSZP-SZDSZ).   
1995  Introduction of the economic austerity package 
1998   Election victory of center-right Fidesz.  Coalition government  
  (Fidesz-FKGP-MDF). 
1999  NATO membership.   
2002  Election victory of center-left MSZP.  Coalition government  
  (MSZP-SZDSZ). 
2004   EU membership.   
2006  The governing party (MSZP) re-elected for the first time.   
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  Coalition government (MSZP-SZDSZ).  In the autumn, violent  
 clashes on the streets between anti-government protesters and  
  the police. 
2008-10  First minority government (MSZP). 
2010  Election victory of Fidesz-KDNP leads to its super-majority in  
the parliament.  The era of the System of National Cooperation 
(NER) declared. 
2011   New constitution (Fundamental Law) passed by the votes of 
pro-government MPs only. 
2012-3   Checks and balances deconstructed, electoral law changed in 
favor of the governing party. 
2014   Free but unfair elections, Fidesz re-elected,  ‘illiberal state’ 
declared. 
2016   Pro-government paramilitary forces prevent a referendum  
  initiated by the opposition.  Government-initiated referendum on  
  migration quotas turns to be invalid. 
2016-7  Vehement anti-immigrant campaign against Islamic migrants  
(and against George Soros and the European Union for their 
allegedly soft migration policy) 
2017  Repeated government attacks on independent NGOs 
2018   Government attack on the migration policy of the United  
  Nations.  Non-free elections resulted in the third consecutive  
  electoral victory of Fidesz. 
 
 
 
 
Fact sheet 
Area 93,030 km2
Population (2011) 9,937,62856 
Major cities (2016)57  
Budapest:  
Debrecen 
Szeged 
Miskolc 
 
1 759 407 
203 059 
162 621 
158,101 
Below the poverty line (2014) 15.9%58 
Unemployment rate (2016) 5.1%59 
GDP per capita (2016): $26,68960 
Higher education (2011) 19%61 
Literacy rate (2015) 99.4%62 
 
 
The five largest ethnic and national minorities in Hungary 
  Minority 
membership 
Percentage of 
Total Population
1. Roma 315,583 3.18% 
2. German 185,696 1.87% 
3. Romanian 35,641 0.36% 
4. Slovak 35,208 0.35% 
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5. Croatian 26,774 0.27% 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, “Population Census 2011,” 
http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/.  Access: 10 November 2017. 
 
Parties in the Hungarian Parliament63 
Party Deputies
Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Union – Christian 
Democratic People’s Party (Fidesz-KDNP) 
133 
Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) 26 
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 20 
Democratic Coalition (DK) 9 
Politics Can Be Different (LMP) 8 
Together (Együtt) 1 
The National Self-Government of Germans 
Living in Hungary 
1 
Independent 1 
 
 
 
Prime Ministers and Their Cabinets 
 
1990-3  József Antall   (MDF-FKGP-KDNP) 
1993-4  Péter Boross   (MDF-KDNP) 
1994-8  Gyula Horn   (MSZP-SZDSZ) 
1998-2002 Viktor Orbán   (Fidesz-FKGP-MDF) 
2002-4  Péter Medgyessy  (MSZP-SZDSZ) 
2004-9  Ferenc Gyurcsány  (MSZP-SZDSZ; 2008-9: MSZP minority government) 
2009-2010  Gordon Bajnai  (MSZP) 
2010-  Viktor Orbán  (Fidesz/KDNP) 
 
 
 
Presidents (Elected by Parliament) 
 
1990-2000 Árpád Göncz 
2000-5  Ferenc Mádl 
2005-10 László Sólyom 
2010-12 Pál Schmitt 
2012-  János Áder 
 
 
 
Short biographical portraits of two political figures 
 
Árpád Göncz (1922-2015) was the first President of the democratic Hungarian 
Republic.  He served two terms as President between 1990 and 2000.  While his 
activist approach to the office during his first term generated some controversies and 
Supreme Court decisions, it also helped to clarify constitutional ambiguities about the 
division of competencies between various government institutions of the new 
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democratic regime.  He was active in politics, taking advantage of his most powerful 
constitutional tool, the right to speak out on political questions in the media or 
parliament efficiently. 
In 1990, Árpád Göncz was elected with the support of Conservative and 
Liberal fractions in the Parliament, while in 1995 he was re-elected with the support 
of Socialist and Liberal fractions.  In his second term, he became much less active in 
shaping internal politics and focused on fulfilling mostly his ceremonial duties.  His 
popularity as a politician remained high throughout and beyond his terms and his 
conduct in office won general respect and popularity for the presidency as well. 
Due to his activity in the 1956 revolution, Árpád Göncz spent five years in 
prison in 1958-63.  In the 1980s, he was known as an author and literary translator of 
the works of numerous British and American authors.  In 1988-90, he served as 
Chairman of the Hungarian Pen Club.  In 1988, he was a founding member of the 
Alliance of Free Democrats.   
 
 
Viktor Orbán (1963- ) served as Prime Minister between 1998 and 2002 and has 
served in that office again since 2010.  He was one of the founders of Fidesz, which 
originally started as an anti-regime youth organization in 1988 and later became a 
left-liberal party that entered parliament in 1990.  Orbán rose to public recognition in 
1989 after giving an address at the reburial of Imre Nagy and other martyrs of the 
1956 revolution, openly demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.   
Between 1993 and 1995, his party moved to the center-right, and established 
close relationship with religious denominations.  Orbán was first elected Prime 
Minister in 1998 as the leader of a center-right coalition government, consisting of his 
party Fidesz, the Smallholder’s Party, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum.  
Although he lost the subsequent elections in 2002 and 2006 to the Socialist Party, he 
managed to retain his position as the president of Fidesz and rebuilt his party while in 
opposition.  As part of this process, Orbán expanded his control over his party after 
2003, making sure that no party candidate could run in the elections without his 
consent. 
In 2010, he returned to power as the charismatic leader of the Fidesz-KDNP 
party alliance that received two-third majority of seats in the Parliament and was re-
elected twice—in 2014 and 2018.  His “system of national cooperation” provided the 
foundation for Orbán’s restructuring of the political system, creating what he calls an 
“illiberal democracy.”  He changed the constitution, put an end to the system of 
checks and balances, rewrote electoral laws to Fidesz’s advantage, asserted strong 
control over not only the party but also the state bureaucracy and most of the media, 
and restricted the political rights of the citizens.  His rule is personalist and 
authoritarian.  He has increasingly used an ethno-nationalist discourse and, as a 
consequence, has moved away from the political center to represent a right-radical 
position.  The end result has been the systematic deconstruction of liberal democracy 
and the birth of an autocratic hybrid regime between democracy and dictatorship. 
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